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ABSTRACT 
Tbs  paper develops a descriptive framework to provide a basis for 
prescriptive considerations for improving societal decision processes, 
such as that concerned with the siting of energy facilities that offer long- 
run benefits but at  the risk of catastrophic consequences. The descrip- 
tive model incorporates multiple parties and multiple concerns in a 
dynamic setting. It emphasizes the potential for conflict emerging among 
the interested parties as a result of their differing objectives, mandates, 
and information sources. Of particular importance is the decentralized 
and sequential nature of the process. On the prescriptive side, the paper 
explores the role that analysis, including risk analysis assumption 
analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis, can play in improving the 
decision process. The descriptive model and prescriptive considerations 
are dustrated by a concrete example-the siting of a liquefied natural gas 
terminal in California. 
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A DESCRIPTIYE MODEL OF CHOICE 
FOR SITING FACILITIES: 
THE CASE OF THE CALIF'ORNLA LNG TERMINAL 
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I. INTRODUCTION** 
Large-scale, novel technologies such as nuclear power or liquefied 
energy gas promise to yield benefits to society, but only at  the cost of 
potential catastrophic losses. Thus the siting of the facilities for these 
technologies presents a formidable challenge to political risk manage- 
ment processes. There are two features of these problems which make 
them particularly difficult to structure analytically. First, the decision on 
whether to site a facility in a particular location affects many different 
individuals and groups in society rather than being confined to the nor- 
- 
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ma1 relationship of a private market transaction, when one purchases 
items like food, appliances or a car. If a gas terminal is sited, there is a 
class of firms and consumers who stand to gain from the new energy 
source. Among other possible social costs, the individuals living near a 
proposed site will be exposed to a new hazard. Their views as to whether 
the benefits are worth the extra risks from the new technology are  likely 
to differ from each other. Those who are  not directly affected by the pro- 
posed site will see the problem somewhat differently. Hence there is the 
potential for conflict between interested parties. 
A second feature of the siting problem is the absence of a data base 
which provides conclusive statistical evidence on the likely performance 
of the new technology and the probability distribution associated with 
potential accidents. Each of the interested parties may thus provide dif- 
ferent estimates of the chances and consequences of certain events. 
There are n o  objective measures to settle these differences. 
This paper proposes a descriptive model of societal choice for 
characterizing problems such as the siting of energy facilities where the 
above two features are present. We illustrate the model in the context of 
a particular case study-the siting of liquefied natural gas terminals in 
California. The final portion of the paper suggests how this framework for 
descriptive analysis might provide insights to aid political decision 
processes. 
11. A DESCRIPTlTE MODEL OF CHOICE 
A. BASIC CONCEPTS 
1. Many Interested Parties 
An important feature of the societal decision-making problem 
represented by the siting of a facility is the presence of a number of dif- 
ferent interested parties, each with its own objectives, data base and con- 
straints (Keeney 1980). For instance, locating an energy facility in a par- 
ticular region will be perceived differently by each of the following 
relevant parties: 
G o v e r n m e n t  Agencies 
Government organizations are constrained in their actions by legisla- 
tive mandates. For example, in the siting of LNG facilities, the Depart- 
ment of Energy must determine whether t h s  new source of energy is in 
the national interest. Regulatory agencies are an integral part of the pol- 
itical process. Their actions influence the nature and distribution of the 
public's preferences and provide advantages to some interests relative to 
others in their efforts to affect the outcome of the societal decision pro- 
cess (Jackson and Kunreuther 1981). These organizations are  qualita- 
tively different from those in the following three categories, in that  
government agencies, although they may in some cases have a n  interest 
in a particular outcome, are basically the rule makers and "referees" of 
the process, while the other parties are the "players" with costs and 
benefits directly linked to the outcome of the process. 
I n d u s t r y  
Firms whlch are involved in the construction and operation of an  LNG 
plant will focus on the potential economic benefits to them in relation to 
the cost. In addition to the cost of building and operating the facility, 
safety features of the plant are also a concern since the firm may be par- 
tially or fully responsible for the consequences of any accidents to the 
public. 
Local Community 
Residents in the community where the plant is to be sited may have 
different views of the situation. Some might see the economic benefits, 
e.g., reduced property taxes or employment, as justifying the increased 
risk associated with the  plant. Others may feel differently. For instance, 
they may view the additional risk as unacceptable and/or they are 
opposed to new technologies on ideological grounds (Otway and von Win- 
terfeldt). 
P u b l i c  Interest Ciroups 
Recently we have seen the rise of very intense public interest groups. 
These organizations generally represent the interests and preferences of 
one component of the public. For example, the membership of the Sierra 
Club is concerned with the effects that the siting of any new facility will 
have on the environment. Wilson (i975) and Mitchell (1979) have pointed 
out that  those at tracted to such organizations have strong, particular 
interests whch  dictate the agenda of the organization and influence the 
type of information that  is collected and processed. 
2. Sequential Decision Process 
A second feature of the siting problem is tha t  the process is charac- 
terized by sequential decisions. March (1969) notes that individuals and 
groups simplify a large problem into smaller subproblems because of the 
difficulty they have in assimilating all alternatives and information. Often 
constraints due to legislation and legal considerations dictate the order 
in w h c h  certain actions must be taken. In the case of siting LPJG termi- 
nals in California, for example, the California Coastal Commission was 
mandated to rank a set  of alternative sites before the California Public 
Utilities Commission could select a site for approval. This type of quasi- 
resolution of conflict through formal decentralized procedures is very 
common in organizations where departments with different goals and 
constraints attend to different decisions a t  di'yerent times. Cyert and 
March (1963) provide empirical evidence suggesting that  the organization 
factors its decision problems into subproblems each of w h c h  are 
assigned to different units. 
If the process is sequential in nature then the setting of an  agenda is 
likely to play a role in determining the final outcome as  well as the length 
of time i t  takes to reach it. By agenda setting we are  referring to the 
order in wbch  different subproblems are considered. There is strong 
empirical evidence from the  field as well as from laboratory experiments 
(see Downs i973; Cobb and Elder i975; and Levine and Plott 1977) that  
different agendas for the same problem frequently lead to  different out- 
comes. There are two principle reasons for t h s .  Once a particular deci- 
sion has been made on a subproblem this serves as a constraint for the 
next subproblem. If the order of the subproblems is reversed then there 
would likely be a different se t  of choices to consider. Secondly, each sub- 
problem involves a different set  of interested parties who bring with them 
their own se t  of data to bolster their cause. The timing of the release of 
this information may have an effect on later actions. For example, 
citizens groups normally enter  the scene with respect to siting problems 
only when their own community is being considered as a possible candi- 
date.  The data on the risks associated with siting would be released a t  a 
slower rate (but perhaps with greater  emphasis and more political 
impact) if only one site was considerd a t  a time than if all potential sites 
were evaluated simultaneously. 
3. Differences in Information Utilized 
Finally, there  is considerable evidence from field and laboratory 
experiments suggesting that  the small data base for judging outcomes 
and performance will cause systematic differences in the way information 
is utilized at  different stages of the decision process. Tversky and Kahne- 
man (1974) describe one of these phenomenon under the heading of avai- 
lability whereby one judges the frequency of an  event by the ease with 
which one can retrieve it from memory. Special reports on a recent 
disaster call attention to the dangers associated with a particular tech- 
nology. These events may drastically change the estimates of specific 
outcomes and are also likely to stimulate efforts to induce new legislation 
to "prevent" the event from reoccurring (Walker 1977). Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1979) summarize their recent experimental stu- 
dies by cataloguing the perceptions of individuals on the perceived proba- 
bility of occurrence and consequences of different types of hazards. One 
of their principal conclusions is that these estimates tend to be labile and 
hence are likely to change over time because of events whch are 
highlighted by mass media coverage. Ths  finding reinforces the impor- 
tance of focusing on changing perceptions of interested parties over time 
and the need to study the dynamics of societal decision-making. 
B. A FORMAL STRUCTURE 
The above concepts are now incorporated into a model of a sequen- 
tial decision process wh ch  involves different interested parties at  each 
stage. The approach focuses on more than one attribute and many 
interested parties. Hence we have labeled it the Multi-Attribute, Multi- 
Party (M.4VP) approach. In developing this structure we have been 
greatly influenced by the concepts discussed by Braybrooke (1974) where 
he looks upon the  political system "as a machine or  collection of 
machines for processing issues." (p.1).  Since we view the siting problem 
as a decision with multiple objectives, the notation we utilize below builds 
on tha t  of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) who are  primarily concerned with a 
single decision-maker. Our interest  here  is in extending these concepts 
t o  the  case where there  a r e  many interested parties who interact  over a 
finite horizon. 
1. Rounds 
The decision process can be separated into different rounds w h c h  we 
label by capital le t ters ,  A,B, ... A round is simply a convenient device t o  
illustrate a change in the focus of discussions. This new focus o r  direction 
can be triggered by (i) a key decision taken (or  a s talemate reached due 
t o  conflicts among part ies) ,  or  (2) a change in the  context of the discus- 
sions due to a n  unanticipated event, the entrance of a new par ty  or  new 
evidence t o  the debate.  Rounds are simply a convenient way of segment- 
ing the  decision process; there  is no assumption, however, t h a t  they can- 
not be simultaneous or  overlapping. 
2. Problem Bounds 
The decision process in each  round is bounded by a se t  of issues, 
decision constraints and procedures.  Braybrooke (1974) refers t o  a n  
"issue-circumscribing phase where the alternatives for discussion a r e  
bounded by generally accepted though not necessarily irrefutabble, facts  
and values, e.g. ,  "it is technically feasible to import  LNG to  California" o r  
"California needs LNG". Other bounding constraints include legislative 
and legal mandates requiring specific parties to be part  of the debate; 
resource constraints whch have the effect of limiting certain parties 
from exerting an influence because they do not have adequate funds and 
means; and prespecified voting procedures indicating what parties have 
the power to influence the outcome of specific decisions and in what 
ways. As we have already noted the problem is also bounded by the deci- 
sions from earlier rounds. Clearly the agenda setting process will have an 
impact on final outcomes through t h s  latter type of bounding con- 
straints. 
3. Initiating Events 
Generally, a round of more-or-less official discussions is initiated by 
a formal or informal request. Informal discussions may be initiated sim- 
ply by such actions as a request for information on the part of one of the 
parties or a request for preliminary discussions. Because the particular 
form of these initiating requests may further define or limit the bounds of 
the discussion, the careful scrutiny of their wording is important. For 
example, it may make a difference in the decision process if the question 
is framed as "Is there a site whch is appropriate?", or "wbch of the sites 
x, y, and z is the appropriate site?" Braybrooke (1974) refers to the first 
question as a "whether question" and the second as a "which question. 
Whether questions demand more complicated considerations and detailed 
thinking whle whch-questions can be approached with simpler rules of 
thumb and heuristics. 
4. Alternatives, Attributes, and Decisions 
No mat ter  how a round is initiated i t  is characterized by a unique 
problem formulation w h c h  is presented in the form of a set of alterna- 
tives. We define the alternatives for Round A to be A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ,  . , . ; Round 
B has alternatives B ' , B ~ , B ~  . . , . There can be several decisions made in 
any round but by definition they are based on the same set of alterna- 
tives. Each alternative is characterized by a se t  of attributes X 1 . . . . . X n .  
The value of any attribute can change from round to round on the basis of 
new information or perceptial changes. For certain attributes any party 
involved may have target or aspiration levels which determine whether he 
considers a particular alternative in Round A to be acceptable with 
respect to attribute Xi. An aspiration level frequently used in siting deci- 
sions is whether the probability of a catastrophic accident a t  a particular 
site is below a present acceptable level (1980). 
5. Interaction Phase 
To understand a particular pat tern  of institutional choice it is neces- 
sary to analyze a se t  of policy actors !PI their interactions with one other 
a t  different stages of the process, and the information available to them. 
We define Pk to be the kth interested party in the debate. His evaluation 
of alternative A' is given by and is based on his estimation of the levels 
of each attribute resulting from that option, the value to h m  of each of 
those levels, and the relative importance he gives to each attribute. 
Another party might have different estimates of the effects of an option, 
different costs and benefits resulting from those effects, or,  assign 
different relative importance to each of the attributes. Because of any of 
these dGferences one party may rank alternatives differently than 
another. As we shall see in our analysis of the California case t h s  hap- 
pened frequently. Thus in the case of two interested parties and two 
alternatives it is possible that  party 1 prefers A ]  to A~ (i.e.,  A! > A ; ) ,  
while party 2 has the reverse reaction (i.e.,  A: > A ; ) .  Conflict frequently 
emerges for this reason. 
Another important feature of the decision process is that the value of 
an  attribute to the same interested party can change over time because 
of new information. For example, if a report provides new insight into the 
seismic risk associated with a particular site this may cause a change in 
the perception of t b s  attribute by one or more of the parties involved. 
That change may take the form of a different estimate of the level of the 
attribute for that site, or even a different relative importance for the 
attribute. 
The interaction among the parties is represented by the main argu- 
ments each brings to the debate in support of or in rejection of each of 
the alternatives a t  hand. Those arguments may relate to only one or two 
attributes. It is not suggested here that the arguments presented for or 
against a particular proposal necessarily reflect a concern of the party 
making the argument. For example, a party opposed to a site because of 
its concern for environmental quality may present an  argument using 
seismic risk as the main reason to reject the site. The argument attri- 
bute may be selected to maximize the effectiveness of the argument, not 
to reflect the actual concern of the  party. The argument reflects a stra-  
tegy on the part  of the actor in support of or opposition to the proposal. 
Arguments or positions are generally well thought out since it is impor- 
tant  that a policy maker take a position that cannot be shown to be 
inconsistent with past and ongoing policies or  decisions. The strategy of 
the actors can reveal a number of underlying motives and desires of 
those concerned and may be essential in understanding the interpreta- 
tion and use of scientific evidence, including risk analyses. 
Observing the interaction phase over the various rounds can provide 
useful insights into the process. The stability of the system can, a t  least 
partially, be judged by the degree to which the actors--people holding 
certain recognized positions (i.e., officials experts, group leaders) or col- 
lections of these people, whether formally organized institutions or 
loosely working alliances-remain the same over each successive round. 
The interaction phase can also demonstrate the extent to which the polit- 
ical debate approximates an ideal or logically full debate, where each 
argument is confronted--heeded or rebuffed--by each actor , ,  followed by 
counter arguments, and so on. A social debate on a n  issue is merely sym- 
bolic if the actors respond to the arguments presented only as signals for 
asserting or reasserting their own unmodified views. In thls connection, 
the MAMP model can indicate to what extent the debate falls short of 
being a full debate, and for what reasons. 
6. Concluding a Round 
The round is concluded by a decision, a stalemate, a char ge in infor- 
mation (changing the focus of the debate and hence initiating a new 
round), or an unanticipated event aborting the discussions and requiring 
a new round of inquiry. Each decision can, in turn, be described by the 
tradeoffs implicit in the choice made. These tradeoffs may not be expli- 
citly recognized by the decision maker, or not explicitly analyzed in the  
process making the decision. The distinction between a "decision-maker" 
and a decision resulting from a process is an important one since the per- 
son responsible for the decision often cannot be identified (see Allison 
1971 and Majone 1979).  
Figure 1  provides a schematic diagram of the MAMP model. Each 
round is set  in the context of certain constraints that circumscribe the  
issues and bound the problem. An initiating event determines an initial 
set  of alternatives l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' . ' ]  whch ,  in turn, induce a set  of interested par- 
ties iPkj  to enter  the scene. Each of these parties has its own prefer- 
ences over the above alternatives (and perhaps some new ones); these 
preferences are defended by reference to the attributes. Conflict 
between parties is likely to emerge.The interaction process results either 
in a clear decision or an  outcome that  does not have the appearance of a 
decision but that  does conclude the round. The conclusion of round J  can 
take one of two forms. If there is a feasible and agreed-upon solution or if 
no solution is possible, the process ends. However, if one or more parties 
is unsatisfied with the situation a t  the  end of the round, and has recourse 
to other channels, or if the round ends in a request for further action, 
problem bounds are created for Round J + 1  and the above sequence is 
repeated for another set of alternatives, interested parties (some or all 
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A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
hquefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy w h c h  
requires a fairly complicated technological process that  has the potential, 
albeit with very low probability, of creating severe losses. For purposes of 
transporting, natural gas can be converted to liquid form a t  about 1/600 
its gaseous volume. It is shpped  in specially constructed tankers and 
received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification and is then dis- 
tributed. The entire system (i.e., the liquefaction facility, the LNG tank- 
ers ,  the receiving terminal and regasification facility) can cost more than 
31 billion to construct (Office of Technology Assessment 1977). In 1974, 
three LNG terminals were proposed for California. After seven years of 
negotiations, hearings and studies, on three levels of government, there is 
still no approved site for any of the proposed terminals in California. In 
this paper, we cannot begin to cover, much less assess, the many and 
varied aspects of this procedure, (for a review, see Linnerooth 1980 and 
Lathrop 1981). Our purpose here is to give a "bare bones" account, to 
illustrate how the MAMP model can be used to structure and understand 
the decision process. 
B. INTERESTED PARTIES AND RELEVANT ATTRIBUTES 
To structure the siting process we need to have a good understand- 
ing of the different concerns of the interested parties. For the LNG prob- 
lem there were three categories of concern which are relevant: risk 
aspects, economic aspects, and environmental aspects. Each of these 
concerns can be described by a se t  of attributes. Table 1 depicts an 
interested party/attribute matrix showing the main concerns of each of 
the relevant groups over this seven year period. 
The attributes listed have been selected to reflect the nature of 
debates in the process, that  is, to reflect the attributes as perceived by 
the parties in the debate, rather than to characterize in some logical 
analytical manner the alternatives. For example, population risk (Xz) 
involves the risk to life and limb to neighbors of the LNG terminal due to 
accidents including earthquake-induced accidents. Earthquake risk (X3), 
which involves both population risk and su?ply interruption risk due to 
earthquakes, is included as a separate attribute since it was handled as 
such in the process. 
The filled cells in Table 1 indicate which parties pay particular atten- 
tion to whlch attributes. Naturally, many of the parties care about all the 
attributes listed. However, either because of the incentives directly felt 
by the party or because of the role the party plays in society, each party 
makes its decisions as a function primarily of a particular subset of the 
- x n  
X X X  
i - 3  
X X X  
attributes. For example, whle the applicant is certainly concerned with 
environmental quality and risks to the population, its primary responsi- 
bilities and concerns are earning profits for shareholders and delivering 
gas reliably to consumers. Its actions are apt to be motivated by con- 
cerns for profits and gas supplies, and constrained by political and legal 
limits se t  by other parties' concerns for safety and the environment. 
Likewise, the Sierra Club cares about reliable gas supplies, but receives 
membership dues for being primarily concerned with environmental qual- 
ity. Consequently, in a situation where a proposed action increases the 
reliability of gas supply a t  the expense of environmental quality it is rea- 
sonable for the applicant to favor the proposal and the Sierra Club to 
oppose it. These differences in primary concerns may determine a great 
deal of the behavior of the political decision process, and explain how that 
process is apt to differ from the single decision maker postulated by nor- 
mative evaluation approaches. The important message of Table 1 does 
not lie in the details of exactly which cells are filled, but lies in the gen- 
erally great differences between columns of the table. That is, the dif- 
ferent parties in the process care about very different subsets of the 
attributes. 
The applicant, Western LNG Terminal Associates, was a special com- 
pany set  up to represent the  LNG siting interests of three gas distribution 
utilities: Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric, and 
El Paso Natural Gas Company. As domestic gas supplies seemed to be 
diminishing in the late 19608s, the gas utilities perceived an increased 
risk of supply interruption, which could be mitigated by additional sup- 
plies such as LNG. Quite naturally, the applicant was primarily concerned 
with profitability (xs) and secure supplies of gas (XI). 
A t  the various government levels there are five principal parties. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the principal body in 
the Department of Energy whch  determines whether a proposed LNG pro- 
ject is in the public interest and should be allowed. In making its judg- 
ment it considers primarily the following attributes: risk factors 
(XI ,Xz , and X3), environmental guidelines as reflected in air quality (X4) 
and use of land (X5), and the expected LNG price (X7). 
A t  the state level, the California Coastal Commission (CCC) was 
created in 1976, and has the responsibility for the protection of the Cali- 
fornia Coastline. Its primary concerns with respect to LNG siting are with 
the use of land (X5) and the associated risks (X2 and X3)from building a 
terminal at  a specific site. The California Public utilities Commission 
(CPUC) is the principal s tate body involved in power plant issues and is 
primarily concerned with the rate-setting process. Hence it focused on 
the  provision of energy to California residents and need for gas ( x ~ )  and 
the proposed price of the product (X7). In addition, it has responsibility 
for evaluating the impact that a proposed facility would have on the 
environment and safety. The California state legislature is ultimately 
responsible for the outcome of any siting process. It determines whch 
s ta te  and local agencies have final authority to rule on the feasibility of a 
proposed site. In addition, it can set  standards to constrain any siting 
process. Hence the concerns of the  legislators range over economic, 
environmental and safety attributes as shown in Table 1. 
A t  the local level, the city councils evaluate the benefits of a pro- 
posed terminal in their jurisdiction in terms of the tax, business reve- 
nues, and jobs (Xs) i t  promises to provide. I t  has to balance this positive 
feature with the impact that  the facility would have on land use (X5) and 
risk to the population (X2). Finally, the  public interest groups, 
represented by the Sierra Club and local citizens groups, are primarily 
concerned with environmental and safety i, .sues. 
C.  THE DECISION PROCESS 
The sitirg process in California (whch is not yet terminated) can be 
characterized up to now by four rounds of discussions as shown in Table 
2, whch  provides a summary of the entire process. Each round, in turn,  
containa a summary of how the problem was defined, the initiating event, 
and how the discussions were concluded. The remainder of t h s  subsec- 
tion discusses in more detail the decision process withn each of the 
rounds. The main elements of rounds A, B, C, and D are described in 
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively. 
Round A began in September 1974, when the applicant filed for 
approval of three sites on the California Coast--Point Conception, Oxnard, 
and Los hgeles--to receive gas from Indonesia. The application raised 
two central questions w h c h  defined the problem addressed in Round A: 
Does California need LNG, and if so, which, if any, of the proposed sites is 
appropriate? 
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TaSle 2 :  Summary o f  Rounds i n  C a l i f o r n i a  LNG S i t i n g  Case 
RCUND A 
Problem D e f i n i t i o n :  Should t h e  proposed si tes  be  approved? 
Tha t  is: Does C a l i f o r n i a  need LNG, and 
i f  s o ,  which, i f  any, c f  t l le proposed 
s i t e s  is approp r i a t e?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant  f i l e s  f o r  approval  o f  t h r e e  s i t e s .  
Conclusion: Applicant  pe rce ives  t h a t  no s i t e  is  
approvable  wi thout  long  de l ay  
Problem Def in i t i on :  How shou ld  need f o r  LNG be determined? 
I f  need i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  how should  an 
LVG f a c i l i t y  be s i t e d ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Appl ican t  and o t h e r s  p u t  p r e s s u r e  on s t a t e  
l e q i s l a t u r e  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  LNG s i t i n g .  
Conclusion: Mew s i t i n g  p roces s  set up t h a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  
assumes a need f o r  LVG,  and is des igned  
t o  a c c e l e r a t e  LNG t e rmina l  s i t i n g .  
l r cb l em D e f i n i t i o n :  Which s i t e  should be  approvee? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Eve3t: Asp l i can t  f i l e s  f o r  approva l  c f  P o i n t  
Conception s i t e .  
Conclusion: S i t e  approved c o n d i t i o n a l  on cons ide ra t i on  
o f  a d d i t i o n a l  s e i smic  r i s k  d a t a .  
ROUND D 
Problem D e f i n i t i o n :  Is P o i n t  Conception s e i s m i c a l l y  s a f e ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Regulatory agenc ies  s e t  up procedures  t o  
cons ide r  a d d i t i o n a l  s e i smic  r i s k  d a t a .  
Date 
-
Septenber  1974 
( 3 4  months) 
Jluly 1977 
J u l y  1977 
( 2  m n t h s )  
Septesber  1977 
October 1977 
(10  son ths  
J u l y  1978 
Conclusion: (Xound s t i l l  i n  p r o g r e s s )  
Table 3 :  Zlements of  Round A 
Problem Def in i t ion :  Should t h e  proposed s i t e s  be  approved? 
That  i s :  i h e s  C a l i f o r n i a  need LNG, and i f  s o ,  
which, i f  any, o f  t h e  proposed s i t e s  is apgropr i a t e?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant  f i l e s  f o r  approval  o f  t h r e e  s i t e s .  
A l t e r n a t i v e s :  S i t e  a t  P o i n t  Conception: 
S i t e  a t  Oxnard: A; 
S i t e  a t  Los Angeles: A1 2 3 S i t e  a t  any combination o f :  A , A , A 
I n t e r a c t i o n  : 
Involved P a r t i e s  A t t r i b u t e s  Used a s  Arqcments 
Applicant  1 X1 
FERC 
CCC 
City  Councils P6 
X2 X5 
S i e r r a  CluS P7 
Local C i t i z e n s  8 
Key Decisions: 
1 2 3 1 . could be preferrsd to %, and A3, based on tke fact that the 
decmse  in population r i s ~  outreighs tk increzse in ewirammtal 
degradation. 
- 
2 .  4 would be qpruved &a- the seismic risk is q=- t b n  an 
accatable t h r e ~ ~ b l d .  
Conclusion: 
Applicant  pe rce ives  a s t a l ema te ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  no s i t e  is a p p r o v a l e  
without  long delay.  
Problem Def in i t i on :  How should need f o r  LUG be determined? 
I f  need i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  now shcu ld  an 
LNG f a c i l i t y  be s i t e d ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant  and o t h e r s  pu t  p r e s s u r e  on s t a t e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  LNG s i t i n g .  
A l t e r n a t i v e s :  Consider o f f s h o r e  s i t e s  : 1 
Consider  remote onshore s i t e s :  2 
Consider non-remote onshore s i t e s :  3 
One-stop l i c e n s i n g :  4 5 Licens ing  Agency: CPUC = B , 6 CFC = B , CEE = a'* 
Any c o n s i s t e n t  combination o f  B through a ' .  
I n t e r a c t i o n :  
Invoived P a r t i e s  A t t r iSuces  Used f o r  Arguments 
Applicant  
CCC 3 X2 
S t a t e  L e g i s l a t u r e  P 5 1 2 
Key Decis ions : 
1 7  5 3. I n i t F 4 1  l e q i s l a t i o n  i n t r ~ d u c e d  vhich  Lnciu5ed a , 3- and B . 
2 4 5 4. F i n a l  l e g i s l a t i c n  passed  which i n c c r p o r a t e d  a , a and B . 
Csnclus i o n  : 
Passage cf LNG S i t i n g  Act o f  1977 (S.a.1081) which d e f i n e s  a  
c u s c o ~ -  t a i l o r e d  s i t i n g  procedure f o r  LNG. Some f e a t u r e s  : 
-- CCC nominates and ranks s i t e s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  one a p c l i e d  f o r .  
-- CPUC s e l e c t s  a  s i t e  from the CCC-ranked s e t ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t h e  top-ranked s i t e .  
Table 5:  E l e ~ e n t s  of  Round C 
Prcblem Definition: Which s i t e  should  be  approved? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event:  Appl ican t  f i l e s  f o r  approva l  o f  P o i n t  Conception s i t e .  
(The on ly  s i t e  of  i t s  o r i g i n a l  t..ree meeting t h e  
remote s i t i n g  c o n s t r a i n t  o f  S.B.1081.) 
d t e r n a t i v e s  : ( S i t e s  nominated by CCC p l u s  appl ied- for  s i t e .  ) 
S i t e  a t  Camp Pendleton:  
S i t e  a t  Ra t t l e snake  Canyon: 
S i t e  a t  Po in t  Conception: 3 
S i t e  a t  Deer Canyon: C 
I n t e r a c t i c n :  
Involved P a r t i e s  
Applicant  
E R C  
CCC 
CP UC 
S i e r r a  Club 7 
Local C i t i z e n s  
'a 
A t t r i b u t e s  Used f o r  Armments 
Ksy Decis ions : 
6. < approved conditional on further determination whether or not 
seismic risk a t  Point CoM=eption is acceptable. 
2 7 .  C3 considered acceptable. 
8. Court requires F E Z  to ansirier additicnal da'd t o  Zetmnbe whether 
or  not seismic risk a t  Point Conception is acceptable. 
Conclusion : 
Fnc and BUC t o  ccnsin'Py additional seismic data. 
Table 6 :  Elements of  Round D 
Problem D e f i n i t i o n :  Is P o i n t  Concegtion s e i s m i c a l l y  s a f e ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event:  F'ERC and CTUC s e t  up procedures  t o  cons ide r  
a d d i t i o n a l  s e i smic  r i s k  d a t a .  
U t e - n a t i v e s  : Declare  P o i n t  Conception s a f e  : 
Declare P o i n t  Conception n o t  s a f e :  D 
I n t e r a c t i o n :  
No i r i t e r ac t i on  y e t ,  a s  s t udy  grocps f o r  FERC and QUC examine 
se i smic  d a t a  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  hea r ings .  
Cur ren t ly  Accive P a r t i e s  Attribute Considered 
Key Decis ions : 
None ye t .  Future  nea r ings  a r e  t o  determine whether o r  no t  
s2ismic r i s k . i s  ac~g-le for Point Conception. 
Although the issue was a t  t h s  stage broadly circumscribed, the 
agenda for discussion was set  more narrowly. The wheels of the process 
were set into motion, not by a broadbased energy-policy question ini- 
tiated in Washngton, but by a proposal from industry for three pre- 
selected sites. The importance of t h s  process--where the initiative is 
taken first by industry--in preselecting the agenda for debate cannot be 
overemphasized. The initiating proposal framed the problem as "Should 
the proposed LNG sites be approved?", and not "Should California have an 
LNG terminal in view of the alternatives, costs, risks, etc.?" Setting the 
agenda in this manner did not preclude the "need" question from enter- 
mg the debate, but it did ensure that  the question was only considered in 
the contentious context of a siting application. 
Table 3 also specifies the relevant interested parties who were 
involved in the interaction phase of Round A. There wore four primary 
attributes which were utilized in the ensuing debate among the parties. 
The need for LNG or the risk of an interruption in the supply of natural 
gas (XI) supported the locating of a terminal in a t  least one of the three 
proposed sites. While environmental, land-use considerations (X3) sug- 
gested a non-remote site (Los Angeles and Oxnard), the risks to the popu- 
lation (Xz) argued for siting the terminal in a remote area (Point Concep- 
tion). Finally, concerns about earthquake risk brought about opposition 
to the Los h g e l e s  site, which was found to be crossed by a significant 
fault. 
The interaction phase of round A (see Table 3) indicates the attri- 
butes used as arguments by each of the major involved parties. It is 
important to distinguish t h s  listing of attributes from the listing in Table 
1. Whle Table 1 specifies whch  attributes are of pr imary  concern to each 
party, Table 3 specifies which attributes were used as arguments  by each 
party. Thus while the applicant is concerned with both profit considera- 
tions and supply interruption risk, naturally enough its arguments in sup- 
port of each site stressed supply interruption risk. 
Two key decisions were made during Round A. First, the CCC, con- 
cerned about the catastrophic potential of LNG, indicated that  it might 
favor Point Conception over the  non-remote sites. Ths  decision 
represents a trading off of population risk against land-use environmental 
quality; in the words of the CCC, this was a "people over birds" decision. 
(Ths  decision did not, however, tie the CCC to approval of Point Concep- 
tion. In fact such an approval could be difficult to obtain.) Second, the 
FERC indicated disapproval of the Port of Los Angeles as an acceptable 
site because a recently discovered earthquake fault increased the 
seismic risk above an acceptable threshold. The round was concluded 
with a possible stalemate, a t  least as perceived by industry (Ahern 1980). 
Los Angeles would not receive federal (FERC) approval, Oxnard was not 
likely to receive state (CCC) approval, and Point Conception would face 
very difficult approval challenges a t  the county and state (CCC) levels 
because of its adverse land-use impacts. 
The stalemate of Round A bounded the problem for Round B. I t  was 
clear to all the parties involved that  it was difficult, if not impossible, for 
the applicant to gain approval for a site under the existing siting pro- 
cedure in California. In particular, there were possibilities of vetoing pro- 
posals a t  either the federal, s tate,  or local levels as evidenced by the 
respective reactions to the three proposed sites. Rather than trying to 
operate withn the existing constraints of the process, the interested par- 
ties in the process frequently try to change the rules of the game (Majone 
1979). T h s  is precisely what triggered Round B, where the problem was 
redefined into two new questions: How should need for LNG be deter- 
mined? If need is established, how should an LNG facility be sited? Round 
B was thus initiated when pressure to change the siting procedure was 
brought to the s ta te  legislature by the utility companies, the business 
community and the labor unions in California. Table 4 depicts the 
relevant alternatives which formed the basis for the debate on the ele- 
ments of proposed legislation. 
The industry and business interests,  saw the nearly inevitable prob- 
lem of obtaining local approval for a project in the national interest,  but 
with costs to the  local community. So the utility companies went to battle 
for a bill (S.iO81) which would vest the CPUC with one-stop licensing 
authority, precluding any real interference from local communities. The 
environmental and local interests, on the other hand, objected to a one- 
stop l icens iq  process and favored a bill which required remote-siting. 
The resulting legislation was a compromise between the environmen- 
talists, who supported consideration of off-shore sites, and those who saw 
an urgent need for an LNG facility to assure energy and jobs. The CPUC 
was chosen over the more conservation-minded CCC or the California 
Energy Commission as the agency with state permit authority, preempt- 
ing local governments. As a bow to the conservationists, the CCC was 
given the mandate to choose and to rank possible sites, and to pass these 
rankings on to the CPUC. I t  was agreed that  the site would not be off- 
shore, as some environmentalists wished, nor could it be in a populated 
area,  as the gas utilities wished. Indeed, a nonpopulated area was strictly 
defined. There could be no more than an average of 10 people per square 
mile withn one mile of the terminal, and no more than 60 people per 
square mile within four miles of the terminal. 
The passage of the Siting Act of 1977 (s.1081) opened up a new pro- 
cedure for finding an acceptable site and led to Round C with the follow- 
ing problem definition: Which site should be approved? The round was 
initiated by the CCC whch,  after consideriq 82 sites meeting the 
remote-siting constraint, ranked the top four sites, Camp Pendleton, 
Rattlesnake Canyon, Point Conception, and Deer Canyon, in that  order,  on 
the basis of seismic, soil, wind and wave conditions, rough cost, and coa- 
stal resource considerations. (Point Conception was included in the can- 
didate set because S. ;OBI required that the applied-for site be included). 
These four alternatives form the background for the interaction amGng 
the interested parties in Round C as shown in Table 5. The CCC pased 
these rankings on to the CPUC which chose, by process of elimination, 
Point Conception, on the grounds that  the two higher-ranked sites would 
involve unacceptable delay and would cause unacceptable risk to tran- 
sients (i.e., campers, swimmers, e tc . )  a t  the nearby beaches and public 
parks. The CPIJC, however, could only conditionally approve Point Con- 
ception subject to the utility company's ability to show that earthquake 
faults discovered in the area presented an acceptable risk to the termi- 
nal. 
At the federal level, the FERC staff determined that  the risks of both 
Oxnard and Point Conception were acceptably low, so that Oxnard should 
be preferred on land-use grounds; however, the FERC, choosing to avoid a 
federal-state confrontation ruled in favor of Point Conception. It would 
appear that with both the CPUC and the FERC in favor of Point Conception 
as a compromise site, the issue would be decided. But the checks-and- 
balances of the U.S. system assures that not total authority is vested in 
the legislative branches. After an appeal by the environmental and local 
interests, the Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case back 
to the FERC on the grounds that not all available seismic risk data were 
considered by the FERC in its ruling. T h s  decision concluded Round C. 
Round D is still in progress a t  this time. As shown in Table 6 the ini- 
tiating proposal is bounded by the activities in Round C which frame the 
alternatives as simply whether or not to declare the Point Conception site 
seismically safe. Only two parties, the FERC and the CPUC are currently 
active in the process, and they are considering only one attribute, --the 
seismic risk at  Point Conception. A final decision will depend upon 
whether the new studies show t h s  risk to be above or below some accept- 
able level. 
D. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MAMP DESCRIPTlON 
The purpose of the MAMP representation is not simply to describe a 
political decision process, but to bring a structure to that  description 
that  might suggest institutional reforms. The California decision process 
illustrated in t h s  paper can be interpreted from many varied perspec- 
tives. It is a good example of conflicting national and local interests; it is 
a study of the workings of the adversial nature of U.S. regulatory 
proceedings; it is a precedent-setting report of procedural practice for 
setting energy policy; as well as a n  account of introducing a controversial 
large- scale technology with a small probability of a catastrophic 
accident. Clearly, a full exposition of these interpretations would go 
beyond the more narrow scope of this paper, i .e. ,  to illustrate a frame- 
work of descriptive analysis. In this spirit we will briefly present two 
insights from this approach which are  of particular concern to the IIASA 
Risk Group: the role that  risk and risk analysis have played in t h s  pro- 
cess and the limitations that sequential decision-making places on the  
role of analysis in general. 
In the siting of large-scale, hazardous technologies, a great deal of 
attention has been paid recently to the topic of risk assessment, as  evi- 
denced in a large and growing Literature (see Conrad 1980 and Schwing 
and Albers 1980). It is of interest, to examine the role risk assessments, 
which have been concerned primarily with risk to life and limb, have 
played in the California LNG case. 
D u r q  the course of the LNG debate in California, six studies assess- 
ing the safety risks of the proposed terminals were conducted by the util- 
ity and local, s tate and federal government agencies (for a critical review 
of these studies, see Mandl and Lathrop 1981). The assessments of risk 
commissioned by the applicant and the FERC showed very low numbers 
on various probabilistic measures of risk (expected fatalities per year and 
individual probability of fatality per year), these numbers were inter- 
preted to mean that  the risk was acceptable. ,Alternatively, a risk assess- 
ment commissioned by the  Oxnard municipal government produced simi- 
larly low probabilistic measures of risk (though expected fatalities were 
380 times higher than the applicant's assessment), but interpreted as 
unacceptably high! The explanation lies in the format for presenting the 
results. The Oxnard study described maximum credible accidents (MCAs) 
without accompanying probabilities. Opposition groups interpreted these 
results as evidence tha t  the terminal was not acceptably safe. The muni- 
cipal government, itself, originally in favor of the site, began to  waver in 
its support, probably influenced by the apparent uncertainty of the risk 
and the strength of the opposition groups (Ahern 1980). In sum, risk 
assessments did not provide a single, coherent assessment of acceptabil- 
ity of the risk of an  LNG terminal; their results were subject to interpreta- 
tion depending on party positions (Lathrop 1980). In fact, risk assess- 
ments were used both to  promote and to oppose terminal applications. 
Turning to the importance of sequential decision-making, the most 
fundamental message of the MAKP approach is that  political decision 
processes such as the one studied here tend to be disaggregated over 
agencies and over time. In the California case the  disaggregation over 
agencies does not seem to have had a significant effect on the outcome. 
As indicated in the preceding tables, power was in the hands of the Cali- 
fornia Legislature, the CPUC, and FERC, each of whch considered most of 
the relevant concerns (see Table 1) and each of which was able to apply 
its own subjective weights. The important decision affecting the disaggre- 
gation over agencies in the process by the diminishment of local 
sovereignty (and applicant control) was embodied in the California LNG 
Siting Act (S. 1081). 
In contrast to the disaggregation over parties in the process, the 
sequential aspect of the decision process seems to have been crucial. In 
the seven year course of the process, the need for imported natural gas 
in California diminished greatly. Instead of examining t h s  need, the pro- 
cess, "locked in" by previous decisions, is presently dictating a slowly- 
paced examination of seismic data. 
A second example of sequential constraints is the remote onshore 
condition of S. i 0 8 i ,  which represented a balancing of costs and benefits 
that  have probably changed over time. A final example of undesirable 
effects from sequential constraints concerns the risk of an  interruption in 
the supply of natural gas. Initially, the applicant stressed supply interr- 
uption risk due to shortage of natural gas as a major reason for importing 
LNG to three separate sites. During the course of the decision process, 
for reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the three sites were 
reduced to one site, and the number of storage tanks at  that site were 
reduced from four to two. The planned Point Conception throughput of 
3 58,000 m LNGIday, equivalent in energy flow to roughly 15 modern 
nuclear reactor units (Mandl and Lathrop 198i), is large for one geo- 
graphcal  location. Because of t h s  concentration in one small area, and 
the possibility of routine closures or nondelivery resulting from bad 
weather etc. ,  the net result of the sequential decision process is that  a 
project originally meant to decrease  supply interruption risk has been 
shaped over time into a project that  may increase  supply interruption 
risk. 
TY. SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESCRIPTIVE MEASURES 
The use of the MAMP model for structuring the decision process con- 
cerning LNG siting in California makes clear how the roles, agendas, 
values and power of the different parties, and the dynamics of their 
interaction, determine the way in whch the process steers its path 
through a complex multiattribute choice problem. Since a motivation of 
this descriptive analysis is to provide insights for proposing changes in 
institutional procedures, and especially for suggesting constructive uses 
of analyses to aid those procedures, i t  is appropriate to suggest prescrip- 
tive measures. Of course,institutional change encompasses a range of 
possible measures from radical reforms in the power structures of 
society to more modest proposals for aiding existing decision structures 
through analysis in order to facilitate solutions. As we have shown in this 
paper, the model brings to light problems arismg from the sequential 
nature of a multi-party decision process that might be remedied by a 
more imaginative use of analyses. In this spirit we select two problem 
areas to illustrate directions that analyses could take. 
A. ANALYSIS TO OVERCOME SEQUENTIAL DECISION SHORTCOMINGS 
A general conclusion to be drawn from the MAMP description is that  
the  political decision process examined here solved a complex question 
one piece a t  a time, much as described in the work of Cyert and K .rch 
(1963) mentioned in Section 11. This disaggregation of problem solution 
by sequential constraints could be explained in terms of information pro- 
cessing limitations of the process, terms that correspond to some con- 
cepts of bounded rationality (Simon 1957). The examples presented a t  
the end of the previous section illustrate a fundamental problem with this 
disaggregation: The fact that  the political decision process is sequential, 
with each decision constraining the ones that follow, means that the out- 
come of that  process is apt to be inappropriate if important variables 
change over time. 
Whle the complexity of siting decisions may make problem disaggre- 
gation necessary, analyses can be designed to alleviate the undesirable 
effects of that disaggregation in at  least two ways. First, techmcal and 
economic analyses can make clear the implications for the overall pro- 
cess of the particular alternative and constraints being considered a t  any 
one time. For example, the California process might have been helped 
considerably had the decisions to reduce the number of storage tanks a t  
Point Conception been accompanied by analyses making clear to all par- 
ties the resulting risk of an  interruption in supply. 
A second way in wh ch  analyses might help alleviate disaggregation 
problems is to demonstrate the point a t  which previously-set constraints 
may no longer be appropriate, and so help identify when previous parts of 
the process should be re-opened for consideration in the light of new 
data. While such a role for analyses could be seen as contributing to 
delays in the siting process, that  tendency could be corrected by incor- 
porating delay and cost of deiay explicitly in the analyses. 
B. ILVALYSIS TO CLARIFY PROBLEM BOUNDS AND P M T I  POSITIONS 
Before one begins the process there must  be a clear understanding 
of the problem bounds whlch are  likely to emerge a t  different stages of 
the process. To the extent possible the interested parties should be made 
aware of the different decisions w h c h  have to be made,  how long these 
decisions are likely to  take and the mechanisms utilized to determine the  
final outcome. In other words, some type of normal process should be 
established.. In the same spirit it appears appropriate for each  of the  
interested parties to  specify the  constraints which guide its decisions and 
the assumptions upon which they are based. 
Each party might defend its position by stating the basis for its con- 
clusion regarding site preference. Mitroff, Emshoff and Kilmann (1979) 
have proposed a technique called assumptional analysis whereby the par- 
ties undertake a dialectical approach to  the  problem by being forced to 
defend the assumptions on which they base their position with the oppor- 
tunity to challenge the assumptions of others.  Majone (1979) has sug- 
gested tha t  the  knowledge base on w h c h  to make decisions for these type 
of problems is currently so inadequate tha t  such a process would enable 
one to explore avenues of disagreement and improve his understanding of 
the  problem. 
It is likely, however, that  conflicts will continue to  exist between the  
parties because they have different assumptions on which they base their 
actions. As we have seen  from the MAMP model, public interest  groups 
like the Sierra Club focused entirely on environmental and safety con- 
siderations because that  is the basis for their existence; public utilities 
were primarily concerned with economic factors while government agen- 
cies were forced by legislative mandate to focus on specific attributes. 
There are two analytic approaches which may be helpful in structur- 
ing the multi-party problem so that policy alternatives can be evaluated 
before attempting to introduce them into the political process. Both 
approaches incorporate the differing values held and concerns felt by the 
different parties, and use those to represent and predict each party's 
ranking of alternatives. The first is multiattribute utility (MAU) analysis, 
developed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). In that  approach a utility func- 
tion is developed for each party whch  is fitted to measures of the relative 
weights over attributes that  party seems to employ in making its choices. 
These measures can be developed in the course of direct value elicita- 
tions of members of each group, or in some cases can be estimated from 
past decisions or policy stands. 
A second analytic approach, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), 
has been recently developed by Saaty (1980). This approach is conceptu- 
ally similar to the MAU approach, except that  it uses ratios of reIative 
importance over attributes, and ratios of relative impacts of each of the 
alternatives, as opposed to the more complete utility functions of the 
MAU approach. 
Both approaches r u n  into difficulty in trying to represent equity con- 
siderations. In any problem of social conflict, such as the siting problem 
described here, the alternative selected depends crucially on the relative 
weights given to each party in the process. If full weight would be given to 
the  applicant, i t  would be free to select a denesly populated site; if full 
weight were given to neighbors of the proposed plant, no siting 
application would be successful without attractive compensation 
schemes. Neither analytic approach offers a convenient means to assign 
weights over parties. In both cases, some individual must assign the 
weights, which begs the question of who that individual should be. Keeney 
(1976) has suggested that there is some referee agency which implicitly 
assigns these weights, so the MAU (or AHP) process could simply elicit the 
weights from representatives of that  agency. In the California case, how- 
ever, it is not clear whether that agency should be the FERC, the CPUC, or 
another agency. Perhaps the best way around the equity problem is to 
use the  MAU. or AHP approaches with each of several plausible sets of 
weights over parties. A sensitivity analysis would then shed light on what 
conclusions could be drawn from a range of weights. 
Either the MAU or the AHP approaches can be combined with instru- 
ments of policy analysis, helping the analyst to determine the effects of, 
for instance, incentive schemes and regulations on the performance of 
alternative scenarios. For example, the relevant state or  federal agencies 
might consider the possibility of compensating those who are exposed to 
the risks of a terminal, similarly, additional safeguards might be con- 
sidered. The MAU or AHP approaches would suggest how changes in the 
values of particular attributes might effect the relative desirability of dif- 
ferent scenarios. Of course, other social and political considerations 
might enter these types of decisions. 
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In t h s  paper we have developed a descriptive model of choice, the 
MAMP model, and drawn some presecriptive recommendations where ana- 
lyses might improve societal decision making with respect to siting prob- 
lems. The seven year experience in California in trying to site LNG termi- 
nals points out the need for a well-articulated set of procedures for deal- 
ing with energy problems in the United States. It also suggests the need 
for examining how other countries undertake their siting decisions. 
At  IIASA we are now completing a cross-cultural, comparative study 
of siting decisions in four countries: the Federal Republic of Germany 
(ATZ 1981), the United Kingdom (Macgill !981), the Netherlands (Schwarz 
1981), and the United States (Lathrop 1981). We will apply the MAMP 
model to each of these cases in the hopes of learning about the similari- 
ties and differences among countries and developing a broader se t  of 
guidelines for improving the siting process based on these descriptive 
analyses. Problems of siting new technologies will become more impor- 
tant  as our energy resources become more scarce. We are hopeful that  
through international comparative studies we will gain a better  apprecia- 
tion as to what can be done in the future. 
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